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Analyst coverage and the cost of raising equity capital: 
Evidence from underpricing of seasoned equity offerings  
 
Abstract 
There is limited direct evidence on the impact of analyst coverage on the cost of capital.  In this 
paper, we hypothesize that the amount and nature of analyst coverage can reduce information 
asymmetry among investors and thus lower the cost of raising equity capital.  We investigate the effect 
of analyst coverage on the underpricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), which is a substantial cost 
of issuing new shares.  Based on 4,766 SEOs in the period 1984-2000, our results suggest that more 
analyst coverage is associated with lower SEO underpricing.  Compared with firms without analyst 
coverage, firms with the median level of analyst coverage – three analysts – have a 1.19% lower SEO 
underpricing, a relative decrease of 38%.  This effect is robust to controlling for other factors affecting 
SEO underpricing.  We also examine additional attributes of analyst coverage and find that firms 
followed by analysts working for the lead underwriter, with a reputation for superior ability, or with 
lower forecast dispersion have incrementally lower SEO underpricing.   
 
 
Key Words:  Analyst coverage; information asymmetry; cost of raising capital; underpricing; seasoned 
equity offering 
JEL Classification: G2, G32, M40 





Theorists have long recognized that information asymmetry among investors adversely affects the 
cost of raising equity capital (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991).  When there is information 
asymmetry, relatively uninformed investors are reluctant to trade due to higher potential loss from 
transacting with informed investors (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985).  To trade, 
uninformed investors demand compensation for the risks of trading with informed investors (O’Hara 
2003).  In the case of issuing new equity, firms must issue shares at a discount to overcome the 
reluctance of uninformed investors.  Such discounting leads to smaller proceeds to the firm and a higher 
cost of raising equity capital.1 
Firms can reduce information asymmetry among investors through public disclosures or 
information intermediaries.  Information asymmetry here refers broadly to differences in information 
sets among investors, including both differences in knowledge about the firm and the possibility that 
certain investors are not aware of the firm.  In Merton’s (1987) words, it refers to both the depth and 
breadth of investor cognizance.2 While a large body of research investigates the impact of public 
disclosures on the cost of capital,3 there is limited direct evidence on the impact of information 
intermediaries.  Given financial analysts occupy a central role in the acquisition and dissemination of 
information in capital markets, we investigate whether the amount and nature of analyst coverage is 
associated with the cost of raising equity capital.  
Given that analysts can increase investors’ awareness of and knowledge about a firm, and 
presumably reduce information asymmetry among investors (Merton 1987), it follows that analyst 
coverage should lower the cost of raising equity capital, ceteris paribus.  However, financial analysts 
recently have faced increased scrutiny from investors and regulators, who are concerned with analysts’ 
                                                          
1 See Dye (2001) and Verrecchia (2001) for reviews of the related theoretical literature. 
2 Thus, information asymmetry among investors is related to, but different from, information asymmetry between 
managers and investors. 
3 For example, Coller and Yohn (1997), Brown et al. (2004), and others investigate the impact of management 
forecasts and conference calls; Botosan (1997), Healy et al. (1999), and others study the impact of disclosure 
quality. Healy and Palepu (2001) provide an extensive review of this area. 




alleged conflicts of interest.  Such conflicts of interest arguably interfere with analysts’ ability to reduce 
information asymmetry.  In addition, Zhang (2001) argues that information acquisition by financial 
analysts can benefit informed investors relatively more and actually increase the level of information 
asymmetry among investors.  Thus, whether analyst coverage reduces the cost of raising equity capital 
is an empirical issue. 
We investigate this issue in a context where we can directly measure the cost of raising equity 
capital – the documented underpricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).  SEO underpricing occurs 
when the offer price is lower than the closing price on the day prior to the offer date and represents a 
substantial cost to the firm raising capital (Altinkilic and Hansen 2003).  In the 1990s, SEO underpricing 
is 2.82% of offer proceeds on average and aggregates to over $8 billion.  Underpricing represents a loss 
of $6 million in offer proceeds for an average seasoned equity offering during 2000.  
SEO underpricing provides a powerful setting to examine the effects of analyst coverage on the 
information environment for several reasons.  First, theory suggests that SEO underpricing results 
directly from the information asymmetry among investors (Parsons and Raviv 1985, among others).  
Thus, our evidence can substantiate the link between analyst coverage and information asymmetry.  
Second, unlike indirect measures (such as bid-ask spread) or estimates of cost of capital (such as the 
implicit discount rate used by market participants in valuing the firm’s equity), SEO underpricing is a 
direct measure of cost of raising capital and can be accurately measured.  Third, analyzing SEO 
underpricing is less likely to be subject to methodological issues found in alternative settings.  For 
example, the SEO setting is unlikely to be subject to endogeneity issues because underpricing occurs 
only on the offer date and is unlikely to affect analyst coverage prior to this date.  Further, SEO 
underpricing is not subject to confounding events because any information related to the offering itself 
should be incorporated into stock prices when the SEO is announced, which is generally one month 
before the offer date.  Lastly, relying on an extensive literature in finance (e.g., Corwin 2003; Mola and 
Loughran 2004; among others), we are able to control for other determinants of SEO underpricing.  




Based on 4,766 SEOs in the period 1984-2000, we find that more analyst coverage is associated 
with reduced SEO underpricing, consistent with analyst coverage reducing information asymmetry 
among investors and the cost of raising equity capital.  Compared with firms without analyst coverage, 
firms with the median level of analyst coverage – three analysts – have a 1.19% lower SEO 
underpricing, and firms with the third quartile level of analyst coverage – eight analysts – have a 1.89% 
lower SEO underpricing, a relative decrease of 38% and 60%, respectively.  This result holds when we 
control for other factors affecting SEO underpricing suggested in prior research, such as firm size, past 
returns, return volatility, relative offer size, and the increasing trend in underpricing.   
To further investigate the relation between the nature of analyst coverage and the cost of raising 
equity capital, we examine three proxies for the quality of analyst coverage.  First, we predict that 
analysts working for the lead underwriter can further reduce SEO underpricing.  These analysts have 
better access to information about the firm and have stronger incentives to collect and evaluate these 
data.  Such information is then passed on to capital markets through their research reports.  We find that 
firms followed by analysts working for the lead underwriter have incrementally lower underpricing; 
SEO underpricing is 1.65% lower for firms with lead underwriter coverage than those without, a relative 
decrease of 54%.  Second, we predict that firms followed by analysts with high ability, such as 
Institutional Investor All-American analysts or more experienced analysts, have incrementally lower 
SEO underpricing, since these analysts presumably have better ability to gather and process 
information.  Our results are consistent with this prediction; SEO underpricing is 1.32% lower for firms 
with high ability analyst coverage than those without, a relative decrease of 44%.  Third, we predict and 
find that firms followed by analysts with lower earnings forecast dispersion have incrementally lower 
SEO underpricing.  A decrease in forecast dispersion of one standard deviation is associated with a 
decrease in SEO underpricing of 0.43%, a relative decrease of 14%.  
These findings suggest that the cost of raising capital decreases with both the quantity and quality 
of analyst coverage.  To evaluate the robustness of our results, we conduct several additional analyses.  
First, we predict and find that the mitigating effect of analyst coverage on SEO underpricing is more 




dramatic for small firms than for large firms because information asymmetry among investors is higher 
for small firms and thus the marginal benefit of analyst coverage is greater.  Second, some firms issued 
multiple SEOs and we find that for consecutive SEOs from the same firm, increased analyst coverage is 
associated with decreased underpricing.  Third, our inferences are robust to the potential impact of 
information asymmetry on the amount of analyst coverage and to other determinants of analyst 
coverage, such as firm size, institutional ownership, the number of shareholders, and trading volume.  
Lastly, we find similar results when we use alternative measure of analyst coverage and forecast 
dispersion and when we control for additional variables that might affect SEO underpricing, such as the 
proportion of primary shares in the total offerings, lead underwriter reputation, and mispricing proxies.   
Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by providing direct evidence on the relation 
between analyst coverage and the cost of raising equity capital of followed firms.  It extends the 
literature on the association between characteristics of the information environment and the cost of 
raising capital.  Our results suggest that when analyst coverage is higher, one important cost of issuing 
equity – SEO underpricing – is lower.  These results are consistent with financial analysts being 
effective information intermediaries and are in contrast with the concern that incentives to generate 
investment banking and trading revenues bias analysts’ research so that they contribute little to enhance 
the information environment of the firms they follow.  
Our evidence is important to studies assuming that analyst coverage benefits the followed firms.  
For example, Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1996), Healy et al. (1999), Lang et al. (2003), among others, 
use an increased level of analyst coverage to measure the benefit of improved corporate disclosure.  The 
evidence provided in this paper is consistent with analyst coverage reducing the level of information 
asymmetry among investors and the cost of raising capital, and thus lends empirical support for this 
widely made assumption. 
The evidence also has implications for firms that seek to raise capital using SEOs.  While the 
importance of analyst coverage for firms raising equity capital has been recognized, the underlying 
reasons are not well understood.  For example, Krigman et al. (2001) find that firms conducting SEOs 




within three years of an IPO switch lead underwriters to improve analyst coverage.  They conclude their 
study by calling for more research on understanding why issuers clamor for analyst coverage: “why 
issuers place such high value on sell-side research coverage is a significant and important question for 
future research (p. 278).”  The evidence provided in this paper suggests that greater analyst coverage is 
associated with a significantly lower cost of raising equity capital. 
Finally, the evidence in this paper is potentially useful to policy makers contemplating regulations 
that affect analysts’ research.  For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
recently approved new rules (i.e., NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472) that (i) attempt to protect 
analysts from potential influence by related investment banking business and (ii) encourage independent 
research by firms that have no investment banking business.  The evidence provided in this paper 
highlights an important potential negative (positive) side effect of these regulations – if they reduce 
(increase) the level or quality of analyst coverage, they may also increase (decrease) the cost of raising 
equity capital, ceteris paribus. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses related prior research 
and the advantages of using SEO underpricing as a measure of the cost of raising equity capital.  Section 
3 develops our research hypotheses.  Section 4 presents data and variable measurement.  Section 5 
reports our primary empirical results.  Section 6 provides additional analyses and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Relation to prior research 
We first review the related literature on analyst coverage and then elaborate on why we choose 
the SEO underpricing setting to analyze the impact of analyst coverage on the cost of raising equity 
capital. 
Analyst coverage and information asymmetry 
Prior studies have examined the impact of analyst coverage on the informativeness of stock 
prices.  Lys and Sohn (1990) and Womack (1996) find that analysts’ research outputs are associated 
with significant stock price movements, consistent with analysts’ research conveying information.  Prior 




research also finds that greater analyst coverage is associated with an improvement in the dissemination 
of information.  This improvement is reflected by a smaller price response to current earnings (Lobo and 
Mahmound 1989), more informative prices with respect to future earnings (Ayers and Freeman 2003), 
faster incorporation of common information into price (Brennan et al. 1993), and lower extent of stock 
mispricing (Hong et al. 2000; Elgers et al. 2001; Griffin and Lemmon 2002).   
While these studies suggest that analyst coverage increases the informativeness of stock prices, 
they do not directly address whether analyst coverage is negatively associated with the cost of issuing 
capital.  Moreover, financial analysts are not perfect information intermediaries.  Critics argue that sell-
side analysts sacrifice their independence to support the investment banking business (Michaely and 
Womack 2002).  Analysts’ conflicts of interest might result from a stronger linkage between analyst 
research and investment banking activities, and the increasingly important role of analysts as strategy 
advisors to the companies they follow (Healy and Palepu 2001).  Conflicts of interest cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of analysts in reducing information asymmetry.  Consistent with these concerns, Lin and 
McNichols (1998) and Michaely and Womack (1999) find that conflicts of interest, proxied by 
underwriting affiliation, adversely affect the informativeness of analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations. 
Some argue that analyst coverage can even increase information asymmetry among investors.  For 
example, Zhang (2001) argues that “private information production … has the effect of widening the 
information gap between informed and uninformed investors and increasing the firm’s cost of capital (p. 
363).”  
The above discussion indicates the importance of directly investigating the impact of analyst 
coverage on the cost of raising equity capital.  For this purpose, we choose the SEO underpricing 
setting.  As discussed in detail later in the hypothesis development section, the main argument 
underlying the impact of analyst coverage on SEO underpricing is that investors’ divergence of opinions 
decreases with analyst coverage.  Using abnormal trading volume around SEO announcement dates as 
proxy for divergence of opinions among investors, we substantiate the negative association between 




analyst coverage and divergence of opinions.  The analyses are discussed at the end of Section 4.  
However, it is possible that some inherent firm characteristics (e.g., firm size, information environment 
characteristics) drive both analyst coverage and divergence of opinions (and thus SEO underpricing).  
That is, we face an omitted correlated variable problem.  We attempt to address this problem by (i) 
controlling for firm characteristics in the multiple regressions, (ii) examining the relation between 
change in analyst coverage and change in SEC underpricing between consecutive SEOs, and (iii) using 
residual analyst coverage from the regression of analyst coverage on firm size (to further control for the 
impact of firm size).  Despite these attempts, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that some 
omitted firm characteristics drive our results, and we caution readers to keep this in mind when 
interpreting the results. 
Advantages of analyzing SEO underpricing 
In the SEO underpricing setting, we can directly measure the cost of raising equity capital in this 
setting.  SEOs are registered with the SEC under a red-herring (preliminary) prospectus.  Once the 
registration statement has been filed with the SEC, the waiting period begins.  During the waiting 
period, which typically lasts around 20 days, the underwriter solicits non-binding indications of interest 
from potential investors.  The offer becomes effective when the firm files the final prospectus with the 
SEC.  The final offer price is typically set after the stock market closes on the day prior to the offer date.  
Underpricing occurs if the offer price is lower than the closing market price on the day prior to the offer 
date.  Because the offer price is typically lower than the closing price both before and after the offer, 
SEO underpricing reflects a cost of raising equity capital for the issuers (Altinkilic and Hansen 2003). 
SEO underpricing can be substantial.  Of all SEOs in the period 1984-2000, 31% were priced at 
the closing price on the day prior to the offer, and 63% were priced under.  The economic significance 
of underpricing can be gauged by two measures: the magnitude of underpricing relative to gross spreads 
(the difference between the offer price and what the issuer receives) and the dollar amount of 
underpricing (percentage underpricing times proceeds).  In our sample period, gross spreads are around 




5% of total proceeds.  In the 1980s, underpricing is about 15% of gross spreads; this number increases 
to over 60% in the 1990s.  Similarly, the annual dollar amount of underpricing is less than $50 million 
in 1980s, but increases to over $500 million in mid 1990’s, and reaches $1.8 billion in 2000.   
Since SEO underpricing is a direct measure of the cost of raising equity capital and can be 
accurately measured, 4 it is preferred to indirect measures, such as the bid-ask spread, or other estimates, 
such as the discount rate estimated from market values and analysts’ earnings forecasts based on certain 
valuation models.  These indirect measures or estimates are subject to various limitations.  For example, 
Callahan et al. (1997) suggests that information conveyed from discrete bid-ask spread is limited.  
Likewise, estimated discount rates are noisy: “Not only is the estimation procedure based on 
assumptions about a valuation model of relevance, it also relies crucially on the quality of the inputs of 
the valuation model (Joos 2000, p. 133).”5 
In addition, SEO underpricing has methodological advantages over alternative settings that can be 
used to investigate the impact of analyst coverage on the cost of capital.  First, since SEO underpricing 
is measured over a short window (one day) and after analyst coverage is measured, it is less likely to be 
subject to endogeneity problems than, say, analyzing firm valuation.6  Analyzing firm valuation, as in 
Chung and Jo (1996), can be problematic because prior research shows that analysts tend to follow large 
firms to attract more trade commissions (e.g., Bhushan 1989; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990; McNichols 
and O’Brien 1997; Hayes 1998; Barth et al. 2001).  Second, analyzing SEO underpricing is not subject 
to confounding events as new information regarding a SEO is incorporated into stock prices at the 
                                                          
4 Note that SEO underpricing is only one component of cost of raising capital in the SEO setting.  Other 
components are related to underwriting fees and price changes around SEO.  Examining the impact of analyst 
coverage on those components is left for future research.  
5 Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001, GLS) use a residual income valuation model to estimate the discount 
rate and examine its relation with analyst coverage and forecast dispersion, among other factors.  Although they 
find consistent results in their univariate analyses, they do not include analyst coverage in their multivariate 
analyses and they find inconsistent results for forecast dispersion.  This paper complements GLS by using a more 
direct measure of the cost of raising equity capital and by studying other attributes of analyst coverage, such as 
superior access to information and superior ability.  
6 One might be concerned that growing firms attract analyst coverage and are more likely to have SEOs, 
potentially causing an endogeneity problem.  However, there is no theoretical argument or empirical evidence 
linking past growth with SEO underpricing.  When we explicitly control for growth, we find that (i) our results are 
not affected and (ii) growth is not associated with underpricing.   




announcement date of the SEO.  In contrast, a positive market impact of initiation of analyst coverage, 
as found in Branson et al. (1998) and Bradley et al. (2003), does not necessarily imply a reduction in the 
cost of capital because initiation of analyst coverage is almost always associated with favorable stock 
recommendations (Bradley et al. 2003).  
SEO underpricing and short-selling constraints 
An alternative view of SEO underpricing is that it arises from short-selling constraints.  When 
there are short-selling constraints, the stock may be overpriced prior to the SEO because optimistic 
investors’ valuations are reflected, but pessimists’ valuations are not (Miller 1977).  Thus, SEO 
underpricing potentially reflects an adjustment of prior overpricing, rather than a higher cost of issuing 
equity capital.  
For this argument to explain SEO underpricing, underwriters must adjust for overpricing when 
they set offer prices.  However, they may not have the ability to do so because individual investors’ 
valuations, and thus the extent of overpricing, are unknown.  Furthermore, underwriters may not have 
incentives to correct overpricing because they benefit from a higher offer price and it is a common 
practice to set the offer price based on the observed stock price prior to the offer.7  
Moreover, Miller’s argument suggests a positive price reaction to SEO announcements if 
uncertainty increases due to the SEO and optimistic investors bid up the stock price.  However, prior 
research (e.g., Asquith and Mullins 1986) finds that stock prices generally decrease around SEO 
announcements.  Thus, it seems that, even if optimistic investors tend to drive up stock prices, this 
behavior has little impact in the SEO setting.  Furthermore, market prices on average are not lower after 
SEOs when there are fewer short-selling constraints.  In our sample, the return from the closing price 
before SEO to the closing price after SEO has a mean of -0.05% and a median of 0.00%.  Neither is 
significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level.  This evidence is inconsistent with the argument that 
                                                          
7 Kieschnick et al. (2003) argue that legal liability can motivate the underwriters of IPOs to set offer prices 
comparable to industry peers. In the SEO setting, however, such litigation concern is minimal because the SEO 
firm is well established and it is reasonable to set the offer price based on the prevailing stock price.  




optimistic investors bid up the stock price prior to the offer and the underwriter then adjusts the stock 
price downward when setting the offer price.  
Lastly, the role of short-selling in the SEO setting appears to be different from that under Miller’s 
argument – moving stock prices to their fundamental values and reducing underpricing.  In the SEO 
setting, short-selling has been argued to increase price volatility and SEO underpricing (Gerard and 
Nanda 1993; Safieddine and Wilhelm 1996).  This concern motivated the SEC to impose Rule 10b-21 in 
order to curb manipulative short-selling before SEOs. 
Overall, the above discussion suggests that SEO underpricing is unlikely to arise from short-
selling constraints.  To further ensure that mispricing does not affect our results, we explicitly control 
for mispricing proxies in sensitivity tests discussed in Section 6.  
 
3. Hypothesis development 
The development of our main hypotheses proceeds in three steps.  First, we review causes of SEO 
underpricing.  There are several theoretical studies using information asymmetry among investors to 
explain underpricing of equity issues.  For example, Rock (1986) argues that underpricing is necessary 
to attract uninformed investors to the new issue market.  The particular study that focuses on explaining 
SEO underpricing is Parsons and Raviv (1985), which we discuss in detail below.  Second, we discuss 
the effects of analyst coverage on underpricing.  Finally, we introduce additional hypotheses related to 
attributes of analyst coverage.   
SEO underpricing 
Parsons and Raviv’s basic argument for SEO underpricing is that, because of variation in 
investors’ valuations, investors require a discount from the market price for SEO shares because they 
may not be able to purchase their full demand due to potential oversubscription.  We elaborate below.   
A SEO process has two stages: the announcement stage when the company announces its 
intention to issue a SEO, and the offer stage when the underwriter hired by the company selects the 
offer price and allocates shares.  In the offer stage, the underwriter will offer shares at an initial offer 




price, and investors requesting to purchase at the initial price are allocated their full demand, except in 
cases of oversubscription.  In cases of oversubscription, investors are allocated a prorated fraction of 
their full demand, and in cases of undersubscription, the underwriter lowers the offer price and investors 
waiting to purchase at a lower price are allocated their portion of the remaining securities.  The 
underwriter’s objective is to choose offer prices that maximize the proceeds from the offering.  The 
underwriter’s problem is complicated by investors having differential valuations of the company.  
Parsons and Raviv assume that there are two types of investors: investors with a high valuation and 
investors with a low valuation.  Valuations are only known to the investor, and the key question for the 
underwriter is how to set the initial offer price.  
On one hand, given the allocation rule, the underwriter has to choose an initial offer price low 
enough to encourage high valuation investors to purchase at the initial offer price, rather than attempting 
to purchase at a subsequently lowered price.  On the other hand, the high valuation investors recognize 
that they can successfully purchase at a lower price only in the case of undersubscription at the initial 
offer price.  That is, they may not be able to purchase if they wait for the lowered price.  The 
underwriter uses this threat to charge a relatively high initial offer price, which extracts some of the 
surplus from high valuation investors.  Of course, without knowledge of investors’ valuations, the 
underwriter cannot set the initial offer price high enough to extract the entire surplus.  In equilibrium, 
due to this tradeoff, the initial offer price is a weighted average of the low and high valuations. 
Instead of buying new shares, high valuation investors can purchase shares in the open market 
before the offer.  While high valuation investors might not be able to have their full demand for new 
shares fulfilled because of the possibility of oversubscription, they can purchase shares with certainty in 
the market of old securities.  As a result, the initial offer price is lower than the price for old securities, 
so that high valuation investors are indifferent between purchasing old shares with certainty and 
purchasing new shares with a probability of less than one.  That is, underpricing occurs. 
Information asymmetry, analyst coverage, and SEO underpricing 




While differences across investor valuations is a necessary condition for the existence of 
underpricing in Parsons and Raviv’s (1985) model, the level of the difference positively affects the level 
of underpricing.  The intuition is as follows.  If the divergence in investors’ valuations is high, the 
incentives for high valuation investors to wait for the lowered price are stronger at a given offer price.  
In order to attract high valuation investors at the initial offer price, the underwriter has to lower the 
initial offer price more relative to the high valuation.  A relatively lower initial offer price boosts the 
demand from high valuation investors for the new issues and accordingly, the probability of 
oversubscription is higher.  Thus high valuation investors are willing to pay more, relative to the initial 
offer price, to purchase a share with certainty from the open market of old securities.  That is, the 
amount of underpricing is larger.   
Underpricing is also affected by the number of potential investors in the firm.  As the number of 
potential investors interested in new shares increases, high valuation investors are less willing to wait 
for the lowered price, and thus the underwriter is able to increase the initial offer price and still attract 
enough interest from high valuation investors.  Hence, the amount of underpricing is negatively related 
to the size of the potential investor base.  
In summary, SEO underpricing increases with information asymmetry among investors, including 
differences in investors’ valuations and lack of investor interest.  In extreme cases when there are no 
differences in investors’ valuations or when there are an infinite number of potential investors, SEO 
underpricing will not occur at all.   
If financial analysts fulfill their role as information intermediaries in the capital markets, they 
collect and disseminate information to capital market participants.  More analyst coverage increases 
analysts’ collective ability to uncover and/or disseminate information, and as a result, increases the 
quality of public information (i.e., the precision of public information with respect to firm value).8  It 
                                                          
8 Analysts’ reports may not be immediately available to all investors, but the information therein will be quickly 
reflected in stock prices in an efficient stock market. That is, investors can have access to analyst’ information 
either directly (immediate access or with a lag) or indirectly (through observing stock prices). 
 




can be shown that more precise public information reduces the variation of investors’ valuations.  As 
generally done in the literature, an individual investor’s expectation is assumed to be a weighted average 
of public information and private information, with the corresponding precision (inverse of variance) as 
weights.  When public information becomes more precise, the weight on public information is higher 
and the weight on private information is lower.  As a result, individual investors’ valuations are more 
clustered around public information, reducing the dispersion among investors.9  Put another way, as 
analysts bring more information to the market, the overlap of investors’ information sets becomes 
larger.  This greater overlap of information reduces differences in investors’ valuations. 
In summary, as more analysts cover a firm, pubic information becomes more informative and 
divergence in investor valuations is reduced.  Using abnormal trading volume on the announcement date 
to proxy for divergence in investors’ valuations, we confirm that analyst coverage reduces divergence in 
investors’ valuations.  This analysis is presented in section 4.  
At the same time, more analyst coverage increases the investor base.  Indeed, Merton (1987) 
argues that financial analysts can increase investors’ awareness of and knowledge about a firm and that 
both effects should reduce information asymmetry among investors.  Based on these discussions, we 
predict that: 
H1: SEO underpricing decreases with analyst coverage.   
 
Effect of attributes of analysts coverage on SEO underpricing 
As information intermediaries, analysts with better access to company information or higher 
ability should reduce information asymmetry among investors more than would less informed and less 
qualified analysts, ceteris paribus.  Under the ‘superior access’ hypothesis, research reports by analysts 
associated with the lead underwriter are more informative because these analysts have better access to 
company information and they gain valuable insights from the due diligence and selling processes 
                                                          
9 This is formally modeled by Barron et al. (1998) (Proposition 3) and Gu (2005) (Proposition 2).  While these two 
papers examine the impact of public information quality on divergence in individual analysts’ forecasts, the same 
models apply to divergence in individual investors’ valuations.  
 




(Bradley et al. 2003).  Under the ‘superior ability’ hypothesis, research from analysts with higher ability 
should be more informative.  We use two proxies for high ability analysts.  First, we use Institutional 
Investor All-American team analysts, i.e., analysts that institutional investors perceive to have high 
ability.  Prior research finds that All-American team analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate and 
their stock recommendations are more profitable (Stickel 1992).  Second, we use experienced analysts.  
Hong and Kubik (2003) find that promotion and job termination are correlated with the quality of 
analysts’ research output, such as earnings forecast accuracy, and that financial analysts with low ability 
tend to be demoted and leave the profession.  Thus, experienced analysts are more likely to have high 
ability.  Consistent with this argument, Clement (1999) finds that more experienced analysts have more 
accurate earnings forecasts.   
If analysts’ forecasts are more dispersed, analysts as a group are less effective in disseminating 
information and reducing the divergence in investors’ opinions.  As a result, firms with lower analyst 
forecast dispersion arguably have lower information asymmetry among investors, holding analyst 
coverage constant.  Thus, we predict that these firms should have incrementally lower underpricing.   
In sum, we hypothesize that analysts with superior access to information (H2), analysts with 
superior ability (H3), and analysts with less divergent forecasts (H4) are associated with incrementally 
lower SEO underpricing:  
H2: SEO underpricing decreases incrementally with coverage by analysts who have better 
access to company information, i.e., those associated with the lead underwriter.  
 
H3: SEO underpricing decreases incrementally with coverage by analysts who have superior 
ability, i.e., Institutional Investor All-American analysts or experienced analysts.  
 
H4: SEO underpricing increases incrementally with earnings forecast dispersion.  
 
4. Sample and data 
The initial sample includes 8,007 SEOs of common shares in the period 1981-2000 collected from 
the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Global New Issues database.  As in prior research on SEO 
underpricing, we impose the following restrictions on our sample.  




1) The issues must include some primary offerings.  In primary offerings, a firm issues new shares 
and receives the proceeds, and thus underpricing reflects a cost of raising capital to the firm.10 
2) The issues are offered by firms listed on NYSE or NASDAQ.11  
3) The issues should have data from CRSP in order to calculate our measure of underpricing.  
4) The offer price should be between $3 and $400 to ensure that small or illiquid firms do not drive 
our results.  
5) The issue date should be in 1984 or later so that we can reliably estimate analyst coverage using 
the I/B/E/S Detailed Earnings Forecasts file.12  
These restrictions reduce the sample size by 1069, 1110, 163, 84, and 800, respectively.  We also 
delete 15 observations with extreme underpricing, i.e., outside the range [-0.50, 0.50], because prior 
research (e.g., Corwin 2003) notes that observations of extreme underpricing are likely due to data 
errors.  As a result, the final sample includes 4,766 SEO issues in the period 1984-2000.13 
The two key variables for this paper are analyst coverage and SEO underpricing.  Analyst 
coverage is measured as the number of unique analysts issuing earnings forecasts, based on the I/B/E/S 
Detailed Earnings Forecasts file, in the year prior to the offer.  We also use alternative measures of 
analyst coverage, as discussed in Section 6.  As in Hong et al. (2000), if no earnings forecast is reported 
by I/B/E/S for a firm, its analyst coverage is set to be zero.  As in prior research, underpricing is defined 
as negative one times the return from the closing price on the day prior to the offer date to the offer 
price.  Prior studies (e.g., Safieddine and Wilhelm 1996) observe that the offer date reported in SDC is 
incorrect for offers that took place after the close of trading.  Following prior research, we use a volume-
based adjustment method to correct for errors in the offer date.  If trading volume on the day after the 
SDC offer date is more than twice that on the SDC offer date and more than twice the average daily 
                                                          
10 The other type of offerings is secondary offerings, in which a group of current shareholders sell their shares to 
other investors and the firm does not receive proceeds.  Analyzing SEOs with 100% primary offerings (77% of the 
sample) or including a ratio of primary offerings to total offerings as a control variable in the analyses does not 
affect our results reported below.  
11 To be consistent with prior research, we exclude SEOs of AMEX-listed firms (7% of the original sample) and 
those of firms listed on regional exchanges (4%), although including them does not affect our results.  
12 Since the I/B/E/S Detailed Earnings Forecasts file started coverage in January 1983 and we measure analyst 
coverage in the year prior to the offer, our sample of SEOs starts in 1984.  Although the I/B/E/S Summary file 
started coverage in January 1979, the coverage prior to 1983 is limited and has little variation (Hong et al. 2000).  
13 Prior research finds that SEOs by utilities have lower underpricing.  About 8% (i.e., 388) of our sample SEOs 
were issued by utilities.  Excluding these observations or including a dummy for utilities in the regressions does 
not affect our results reported below.  
 




trading volume over the 250 trading days prior to the SDC offer date, then the day following the SDC 
offer date is used as the ‘correct’ offer date.  This correction applies to 36.1% of the sample.  Altinkilic 
and Hansen (2003) and Corwin (2003) find that this approach is accurate for at least 98% of all 
previously misclassified offers.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the sample SEOs and analyst coverage.  Panel A presents 
characteristics of these issues.  The average offer price is $25 and average proceeds are $85 million.  
The gross spread, representing the difference between the offer price and what the issuer receives, is on 
average 5.12% of proceeds.  Mean underpricing is 2.38%.  All of these descriptive statistics are similar 
to those reported in prior research.  Panel B presents the number of SEOs and the mean underpricing in 
each year.  The number of SEOs is generally higher subsequent to 1990, as is the amount of 
underpricing.  As seen from Figure 1, mean underpricing gradually increases from the 1980s to the 
1990s.  Regressing the mean underpricing on a year variable yields a coefficient of 0.16%, significant at 
the 0.001 level using a two-tailed t-test.  Figure 1 also plots the mean underpricing over the sample 
period for NYSE firms and for NASDAQ firms.  Consistent with prior research, underpricing is higher 
for NASDAQ firms than for NYSE firms in all years except 1988.  
Panel C of Table 1 reports the level of analyst coverage across SEOs.  Approximately one-fourth 
of the sample (1,186) has no analyst coverage.14  Another one-fourth of the sample has analyst coverage 
from 1 to 3, another one-fourth from 4 to 7, and the remainder has 8 or more analysts.  We use these 
four almost equal-sized groups in the univariate analysis.  Note that analyst coverage for these SEO 
firms, as well as high ability analyst coverage discussed below, is comparable to non-SEO firms with 
similar size.  This suggests that inferences from this paper are generalizable to a broader sample. 
Analyst coverage and divergence of opinions 
                                                          
14 It is possible that I/B/E/S failed to include some forecasts.  This potential measurement error could bias against 
finding a difference between firms with zero analyst coverage and firms with positive analyst coverage.  Given 
that I/B/E/S has comprehensive coverage, the misclassification problem is unlikely to be severe.  We discuss the 
implication of this potential measurement error in detail when presenting results.  




Before reporting our tests of the relation between analyst coverage and SEO underpricing, we first 
test whether analyst coverage reduces divergence of opinions among investors, a key argument 
underlying our hypotheses.  While results supportive of our hypotheses are consistent with analyst 
coverage reducing divergence of opinions among investors, a direct test confirming this argument 
strengthens our inferences.  
One commonly used proxy for divergence in investors’ valuations in the extant literature is 
abnormal trading volume around public announcements (Kim and Verrecchia 1991).  The intuition is 
that public announcements induce non-liquidity traders with divergent valuations to trade.  The public 
announcement in our context is the SEO announcement.  Thus, we examine the impact of analyst 
coverage on abnormal trading volume around SEO announcements, i.e., the larger the abnormal trading 
volume, the larger the presumed divergence of opinions among investors with respect to the impact of 
SEOs on firm value.  If analyst coverage can reduce divergence of opinions, we expect a negative 
relation between analyst coverage and abnormal trading volume.  To control for liquidity trading, we 
measure abnormal trading volume as share turnover around a SEO announcement standardized by the 
average turnover in the control period (i.e., the two-months before SEO announcement).  Note that we 
analyze abnormal trading volume around the SEO announcement date instead of around the offer date 
because (i) the newly offered shares of the SEO will confound trading volume around the offer date, and 
(ii) the major news release related to the SEO is at the announcement.  
Prior research on trading volume (e.g., Bamber et al. 1999) suggests that the following control 
variables should be included in the model: firm size, NYSE dummy, the absolute value of stock returns 
on the announcement day, relative offer size, market trading volume, and year dummies.  Firm size and 
NYSE dummy are included to control for the quality of prior information, stock returns are included to 
control for information events that might affect the trading of particular firms, relative offer size is 
included to control for the impact of the SEO size on trading volume, and market trading volume and 
year dummies are included to control for market-wide portfolio rebalancing and year fixed effects.  
Since we measure abnormal trading volume on the SEO announcement date, uncertainty about SEO 




completion can also lead to investors’ divergence of opinions and potentially confound the results on 
analyst coverage.  Accordingly, we control for sales growth and stock returns in the year prior to the 
SEO announcement date, which, along with firm size, have been identified prior studies (e.g., Clarke et 
al. 2001) as important determinants of whether the SEO will be eventually completed at the time of SEO 
announcement.   
We regress the abnormal trading volume measure on analyst coverage and these control variables, 
and the results are reported in Table 2.  We find that analyst coverage is negatively associated with 
abnormal trading volume around SEO announcements, consistent with analyst coverage reducing 
divergence in investors’ valuations.  Thus, we confirm the argument that analyst coverage reduces 
divergence in investors’ valuations.  This result, along with analyst coverage increasing the investor 
base, suggests that analyst coverage reduces information asymmetry among investors by increasing both 
investors’ knowledge about and awareness of a firm.  Based on results in Parsons and Raviv (1985), we 
predict that analyst coverage reduces SEO underpricing, as stated in Hypothesis H1.  Below, we test this 
hypothesis. 
 
5. Empirical results 
Univariate analysis of the relation between analyst coverage and SEO underpricing  
Figure 2 plots the average underpricing of SEOs across levels of analyst coverage.  Consistent 
with H1, underpricing decreases with analyst coverage, from 4.05% (3.16%) for firms covered by one 
(zero) analyst to 0.00% for firms covered by 31 or more analysts.  
Two interesting observations emerge from this figure.  First, the average underpricing for firms 
without analyst coverage is not higher than underpricing for firms with analyst coverage of one and is 
comparable to firms with analyst coverage of two.  One potential reason is that I/B/E/S may not include 
earnings forecasts for some firms, as discussed earlier.  In one sensitivity analysis, we replicate our 
analyses after excluding observations with zero analyst coverage and we find similar results (not 
tabulated).  Second, the relation between analyst coverage and underpricing appears to be nonlinear – 




underpricing decreases with analyst coverage, but at a decreasing rate.  This nonlinear relation likely 
results from the decreasing marginal benefit of analyst coverage.  To control for this nonlinear relation, 
we use a log transformation of analyst coverage in multiple regressions below.  Alternative approaches, 
such as including squared analyst coverage in the regressions, yield similar inferences. 
To test whether the observed decrease in underpricing is statistically significant, we split the 
sample into four almost equal-sized groups based on the level of analyst coverage as shown in Panel C 
of Table 1.  Table 3 reports the mean underpricing for each group and t-statistics for the difference 
between groups.  The untabulated results based on median comparisons are similar.  Overall, the results 
in Table 2 suggest that underpricing for firms with low analyst coverage is significantly higher than for 
firms with high analyst coverage.  The mean underpricing for Group 2 (3.31%) is higher than that for 
Group 3 (2.05%), which is in turn higher than that for Group 4 (1.04%).  All of these differences are 
significant at the 0.001 level.  As suggested in Figure 2, firms with zero analyst coverage (Group 1) 
have similar underpricing to Group 2, but significantly higher underpricing than Groups 3 and 4.  
Multivariate analysis of the relation between analyst coverage and SEO underpricing 
In this section, we use multiple regression analysis to test whether the impact of analyst coverage 
on underpricing holds after controlling for other variables affecting SEO underpricing.  
Prior research on SEO underpricing uses firm size to proxy for information asymmetry among 
investors and finds mixed results (Corwin 2003).  Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that underpricing is 
larger for firms with high uncertainty.  Consistent with this argument, Corwin (2003) finds that 
underpricing increases with return volatility.   
Scholes (1972) argues that, if the aggregate demand curve for a firm’s shares is downward 
sloping, then the increase in supply (i.e., new shares) will drive down the price.  Any permanent 
decrease in price due to an increased supply of shares should occur on the announcement date of the 
SEO, not on the offer date.  However, underpricing may occur if there is temporary price pressure on 




the offer date.  Corwin (2003) uses the offer size relative to outstanding shares to proxy for price 
pressure and finds that underpricing is higher for firms with relatively large offer size. 
Gerard and Nanda (1993) argue that investors may manipulate prices by selling in the pre-offer 
market in order to depress the offer price.  Manipulative trading, on one hand, can exacerbate the 
uncertainty problem and positively affect underpricing.  On the other hand, it can decrease the market 
price and negatively affect underpricing (as measured) if underwriters take into account the temporary 
drop in prices.  Furthermore, the manipulative trading effect should be reduced after SEC Rule 10b-21, 
which intends to address the manipulative trading problem by banning short-selling before offers.  
Corwin (2003) finds that underpricing is positively correlated with negative pre-offer returns, but the 
results on the effect of Rule 10b-21 are mixed (Safieddine and Wilhelm 1996). 
Another potential source of underpricing is the practice of rounding the offer price.  Underwriters 
tend to round the closing prices down to the nearest integer value or to a value with an increment of 
$0.25 when setting the offer price (Mola and Loughran 2004).  Thus, underpricing should be larger for 
firms with closing prices that are not at a $0.25 increment, and for firms with small prices (as the same 
dollar magnitude of underpricing is relatively large in percentage terms for firms with small prices). 
Based on the above discussion, we include the following control variables: firm size, return 
volatility, relative offer size, pre-offer return, a Rule 10b-21 dummy, price level, a tick size dummy, and 
a NYSE dummy.  Negative and positive pre-offer returns are included separately to better control for 
the potential manipulative trading effect.  As in Corwin (2003), we also include the average IPO 
underpricing in the same month as the SEO to control for additional common factors affecting both IPO 
and SEO underpricing.  Figure 1 shows an increasing trend in SEO underpricing, potentially due to 
changes in sample composition and changes in underwriter composition, e.g., more issues are 
underwritten by large underwriters for firms with high uncertainty (Mola and Loughran 2004).  




Accordingly, we include year dummies to control for this trend.  Measurement of all independent 
variables follows prior research and is summarized in the Appendix.15 
Panel A of Table 4 reports descriptive statistics on the independent variables used in the multiple 
regression analyses.  The distribution of analyst coverage is skewed with a mean of about 6 analysts and 
a median of 3.  Our proxy for firm size is market value of equity, which averages $994 million; mean 
return volatility is 0.033; average relative offer size is 22.1% of the pre-offer outstanding shares; mean 
closing price before the offer is $26; 82.4% of the issues are offered after Rule 10b-21 became effective 
(on August 25, 1988); firms listed on the NYSE issue 41.6% of SEOs; and compared with SEOs, IPOs 
have much higher underpricing, 21.4% on average.   
Panel B of Table 4 reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlation matrix in the lower (upper) 
triangle.  The correlations between underpricing and other variables suggest that, as predicted, 
underpricing is lower for firms with high analyst coverage, for large firms, for firms with low return 
volatility, for firms with relatively small issues, for firms with low magnitude of pre-offer returns, for 
firms with high market prices, for SEOs offered in months with low IPO underpricing, and for firms 
listed on the NYSE.  While the correlations between some independent variables are high, 
multicollinearity is not a serious concern as the condition index is under 30 for all our regression 
specifications (Belsley et al. 1980). We include all variables in the regressions to reduce concern about 
omitted correlated variables.   
Table 5 reports results from the regressions of SEO underpricing on analyst coverage and control 
variables.  Model 1 includes analyst coverage only.  The results confirm those reported in Figure 2 and 
Table 3.  The relation between analyst coverage and SEO underpricing is negative and significant at the 
0.001 level.  Compared with firms without analyst coverage, firms covered by three analysts (the 
                                                          
15 Corwin (2003) also investigates whether underpricing is affected by the transaction cost of buying shares from 
the open market and the practice of setting the offer price at the closing bid quote on the day prior to the offer.  
Testing these arguments requires intraday quote data, which is available only after 1993 and only for firms with 
TAQ data, and thus significantly reduces our sample size.  Additionally, Corwin shows that the results on other 
variables are similar in the restricted sample.  Thus, it is unlikely that our results on analyst coverage would 
change if we add these controls.   




median analyst coverage in the sample) have a 1.19% lower underpricing and firms covered by eight 
analysts (the third quartile of analyst coverage) have a 1.89% lower underpricing after controlling for 
the trend in underpricing.  These represent a relative decrease of 38% and 60%, respectively. 
Model 2 includes analyst coverage and the control variables.  The coefficient on analyst coverage 
remains significantly negative.  While the magnitude is smaller than in Model 1, it is still economically 
significant.  Compared with firms without analyst coverage, firms covered by three analysts have a 
0.55% lower underpricing and firms covered by eight analysts have a 0.88% lower underpricing, a 
relative decrease of 17% and 28%, respectively.  The results for the control variables are similar to those 
reported in prior research.  While the impact of return volatility is positive, the impact of firm size is 
insignificant after controlling for other control variables, potentially due to the high correlation between 
firm size and other control variables such as relative offer size and price.  Underpricing is higher for 
relatively large offers, consistent with higher temporary price pressure on these firms.  Both pre-offer 
return variables have significant positive coefficients.  While the impact of tick size (tick<1/4) is 
insignificant, the impact of price on underpricing is negative, consistent with known underwriter pricing 
practices.  The effects of Rule 10b-21 dummy, NYSE dummy, and IPO underpricing are each 
insignificant. 
In sum, the multiple regression analyses confirm results reported in the univariate analyses and 
are consistent with our first hypothesis that SEO underpricing decreases with analyst coverage.  
Compared with firms without analyst coverage, firms covered by three (eight) analysts have a lower 
level of underpricing, from 0.55% to 1.19% (from 0.88% to 1.89%), depending on the model 
specification.16  
Attributes of analyst coverage and SEO underpricing 
                                                          
16 One may argue that analyst coverage proxies for issuers’ bargaining power over brokerage houses in setting the 
offer price because high analyst coverage firms tend to have high growth opportunities and thus great potential of 
future underwriting business.  This is unlikely to be the reason for the observed results for several reasons.  First, 
as discussed before, growth opportunities do not affect underpricing.  Second, we control for other variables that 
are more likely to proxy for issuers’ bargaining power, such as firm size and the relative size of the offering.  




In this section, we test the hypotheses that analysts with superior access to information (H2), 
superior ability (H3), or lower forecast dispersion (H4) are associated with incrementally lower SEO 
underpricing.  To capture the effect of analysts with superior access, we define a dummy variable – lead 
underwriter coverage – that equals one if an analyst from the lead underwriter covers the firm in the 
year prior to the offer.  To capture the effect of analysts with superior ability, we define a dummy 
variable – high ability analyst coverage – that equals one if at least two analysts following the firm in 
the year prior to the SEO are Institutional Investor All-American team analysts or experienced 
analysts.17  An analyst is considered to be an experienced analyst in a given year if his or her general 
experience is in the top quartile of analysts’ general experience in that year.  An analyst’s general 
experience is measured as the number of quarters between the first earnings forecast issued by the 
analyst (for any firm) and the offer date of the SEO.  We rely on I/B/E/S, which tracks individual 
analysts even if they change brokerage houses, to identify the first earnings forecast.18   
Forecast dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of one-year-ahead earnings forecasts in 
the month before SEO, deflated by the closing price prior to the offer.  Because earnings forecasts 
reported in I/B/E/S are subject to rounding errors due to stock splits (as documented in Diether et al. 
2002), we use unadjusted earnings forecasts obtained directly from I/B/E/S.   
Panel A of Table 6 reports descriptive statistics on these three variables.  Because lead 
underwriter coverage and high ability coverage are not well-defined for observations with zero analyst 
coverage, the related analyses are based on the 3,580 SEOs with positive analyst coverage.  Among 
SEOs with positive analyst coverage, 67.3% have lead underwriter coverage and 57.6% have high 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Third, as discussed below, we find that coverage by analysts affiliated with lead underwriters, which is unlikely to 
increase issuers’ bargaining power, negatively affects SEO underpricing. 
17 This cutoff point is chosen such that about half of the SEOs with positive analyst coverage have high ability 
analyst coverage.  Using alternative cutoff points (one or three) yields similar results (not tabulated).  80.2% 
(40.1%) of the SEOs with positive analyst coverage have at least one (three) high ability analyst following.  
18 We do not restrict the first earnings forecast to be for a specific firm or industry because we believe that general 
experience helps investors form perceptions of an analyst’s ability.  Because I/B/E/S detailed forecast data are only 
available from 1983 onward, our experience measure might have low variation in early sample years.  This biases 
against finding results on analyst experience.  Using relative ranks within a given year mitigates this bias.   




ability analyst coverage.19  To ensure the validity of estimated forecast dispersion, forecast dispersion is 
only calculated for SEOs with at least three analysts following, a total of 2,627 SEOs.20  The mean 
forecast dispersion is 0.0052.  Because the sample with forecast dispersion is different from the sample 
with lead underwriter coverage and high ability analyst coverage, we test H4 separately from H2 and 
H3. 
Panel B of Table 6 reports regression results for tests of H2 and H3.  Since we are testing the 
incremental effects of superior access and superior ability, we include analyst coverage in all 
specifications.  We also include interactions between analyst coverage and the dummies for lead 
underwriter coverage and high ability analyst coverage to control for any differential effect of analyst 
coverage (number of analysts following) on SEO underpricing.  Thus, the coefficient on analyst 
coverage reflects the impact of analyst coverage on SEO underpricing for SEOs without coverage from 
analysts with superior access or ability.   
The first two models in Table 6 test H2 and H3 separately.  Consistent with the hypotheses, lead 
underwriter coverage and high ability analyst coverage each significantly reduce SEO underpricing, 
holding total analyst coverage constant.  Coverage by analysts from the lead underwriter reduces SEO 
underpricing by 2.00% (Model 1), and coverage by high ability analysts reduces underpricing by 2.02% 
(Model 2).  The coefficient on analyst coverage is significantly negative as before.  The coefficients on 
the interactions between analyst coverage and lead underwriter coverage or high ability analyst 
coverage dummies are significantly positive, consistent with the marginal benefit of additional analyst 
coverage being smaller for SEOs that already have coverage from analysts with superior access or 
ability.  
                                                          
19 Lead underwriters that do not cover the firm prior to the SEO generally initiate coverage right after the SEO: 
more than 90% of SEOs have lead underwriter coverage after the SEO. 
20 We also replicate the analyses using an alternative measure of dispersion: absolute value of the maximum 
forecast minus the minimum forecast scaled by absolute value of the median forecast, for the sample of SEOs with 
more than two analysts following. The results (not tabulated) are similar to those reported. 
 




Model 3 includes lead underwriter coverage and high ability analyst coverage in the same 
regression.  The results are similar to those from Model 1 or 2.  This finding suggests that both superior 
access and superior ability can further reduce underpricing, holding total analyst coverage constant.  
Model 4 further controls for other determinants of underpricing and the results are essentially the same 
as those from Model 3.  The results on control variables are similar to those reported in Table 4 and thus 
are not tabulated.21    
Panel C of Table 6 reports the results for tests of H4.  Since this sub-sample (with at least three 
analysts following) only represents 55% of the full sample, we first replicate the main analyses using 
this sub-sample (Model 1 and Model 2).  The results on analyst coverage are weaker than those reported 
in Table 5, mainly due to a smaller sample size and a sample composed of SEOs with a relatively high 
level of analyst coverage.  The marginal impact of analyst coverage on SEO underpricing is especially 
small for SEOs with very high level of analyst coverage, as can be seen from Figure 2.  When we 
exclude SEOs with more than 20 (8) analysts following (about 7% (23%) of the full sample), the 
coefficient on analyst coverage in Model 2 becomes significant at the 5% (1%) level.  This indicates that 
for firms already with sufficiently high level of analyst coverage, the benefit of an additional analyst is 
likely small.  
Model 3 and Model 4 include both analyst coverage and forecast dispersion.  After controlling for 
analyst coverage, forecast dispersion has a significant positive association with SEO underpricing.  A 
decrease in forecast dispersion of one standard deviation (0.0082) in Model 3 is associated with a 
decrease in SEO underpricing of 0.43% (= 0.5221 × 0.0082).  The results hold after controlling for other 
determinants of SEO underpricing, as indicated in Model 4.   
                                                          
21 Note that the results on analyst ability complement Mola and Loughran’s (ML, 2004) finding that lead 
underwriters with strong research teams (proxied by the number of Institutional Investor All-American analysts) 
extract rents from SEO firms in the form of higher SEO underpricing.  While we focus on the impact of all high-
ability analysts on SEO underpricing, ML focus on the impact of only those high ability analysts who work for 
lead underwriters.  When we add a dummy variable to indicate coverage by high ability analysts affiliated with 
lead underwriters, we find that its coefficient is significantly positive and the coefficients on other variables remain 
similar.  This suggests that although superior ability can reduce SEO underpricing, its marginal impact is smaller if 
superior ability analysts are employed by lead underwriters. 




In summary, our results on H2 suggest that coverage by analysts working for the lead underwriter 
can further lower SEO underpricing, consistent with the superior access hypothesis.  Superior access to 
information possessed by analysts who work for lead underwriters seems to outweigh their potential 
conflicts of interest in this context.  Consistent with H3, our results suggest that coverage by analysts 
with superior ability (All-American or experienced analysts) further lowers SEO underpricing, and 
consistent with H4, firms with less divergent forecasts have incrementally lower SEO underpricing.  
Overall, these results suggest that, when analysts have superior access, superior ability, or greater 
consensus, their coverage is associated with a further decrease in cost of raising equity capital. 
 
6. Additional analyses 
The effect of analyst coverage on SEO underpricing conditional on firm size  
If reducing information asymmetry among investors lowers the cost of raising capital, this effect 
should be smaller for firms that already have less information asymmetry.  To the extent that large firms 
have less information asymmetry than small firms, analyst coverage has the potential to reduce SEO 
underpricing more for small firms than for large firms.  We test this prediction by including an 
interaction variable between market value and analyst coverage in our regressions.   
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results of two regression specifications.  Model 1 includes analyst 
coverage, market value, and the interaction variable, and Model 2 adds other control variables.  In both 
specifications, the main effect of analyst coverage continues to be significantly negative.  The 
interaction variable has a significant positive coefficient, which is consistent with our prediction that the 
opportunity to reduce information asymmetry among investors, and thus the impact of analyst coverage 
on SEO underpricing, is smaller for large firms.  
Firms with multiple SEOs 
Our sample SEOs were issued by 3,131 unique firms: 2,162 firms issued only one SEO, 635 firms 
issued two SEOs, 170 issued three SEOs, and 164 issued four or more SEOs.  Since the full sample 
includes multiple SEOs from the same firm, one might suspect that the error terms of the regressions are 




subject to cross-sectional correlation.  This concern is unlikely to affect our results as we already control 
for firm-specific characteristics identified by prior research that might affect SEO underpricing.  
However, to further address this concern, we run all analyses using only the first SEO by each firm (not 
tabulated) and find results similar to those reported above.  
Since 969 firms have multiple SEOs, we also analyze whether the change in analyst coverage is 
negatively correlated with the change in underpricing for consecutive SEOs of the same firm.  As 
shown in Figure 3, increased analyst coverage is generally associated with decreased underpricing, and 
decreased analyst coverage is generally associated with increased underpricing.  The difference in the 
change in underpricing between the group with increased analyst coverage and the group with decreased 
analyst coverage is significant at the 0.03 level or better based on t-statistics or Wilcoxon Z-statistics.  
Further analyses (not tabulated) indicate that the effect is mainly driven by the change in lead 
underwriter coverage and high ability analyst coverage.  It appears that firms with increased coverage 
by analysts with superior access to information or superior ability have lower underpricing in later 
SEOs. 
Using residual analyst coverage to further assess the unique impact of analyst coverage 
One concern with the reported results on analyst coverage is that the result might be driven by the 
determinants of analyst coverage, especially firm size.  Prior research suggests that firm size, growth, 
price level, return volatility, and turnover, can affect analyst coverage (Bhushan 1989; O’Brien and 
Bhushan 1990; among others).  Hong et al. (2000) find that firm size is the dominant determinant of 
analyst coverage and other factors do not substantially contribute to explaining the cross-sectional 
variation in analyst coverage beyond firm size.  In the main analyses, we control for firm size (and other 
determinants of analyst coverage) and our results are robust.  Here we report results from an alternative 
approach: analyzing the impact on underpricing of residual analyst coverage, i.e., residuals from the 
regressions of analyst coverage on firm size, as in Hong et al.  This is a conservative approach in the 




sense that residual analyst coverage only captures the unique effect of analyst coverage while the effect 
common to both firm size and analyst coverage is attributed to firm size. 
Panel B of Table 7 presents the mean SEO underpricing for four equal-sized groups classified 
based on residual analyst coverage.22  The mean underpricing is 3.01%, 2.92%, 2.10%, and 1.49% for 
these groups from low to high residual analyst coverage, respectively.  The difference between the low 
coverage group (Group 1) and the high coverage group (Group 4) is significant at the 0.001 level.  
Since the negative association between analyst coverage and underpricing might vary with firm 
size as discussed above, we split the sample into three equal-sized sub-samples based on market value, 
and report the mean underpricing for each intersection of size-based sub-samples and residual analyst 
coverage groups.  Consistent with the negative relation between size and underpricing, small firms tend 
to have higher SEO underpricing than large firms.  More important and consistent with our hypothesis, 
analyst coverage has a negative impact on SEO underpricing within each size-based sub-sample.  The 
differences between groups 1 and 4 are 1.83%, 1.08%, and 1.12% for small, medium, and large firms, 
respectively.  All these differences are significant at the 0.001 level.  
In another effort to disentangle the impact of analyst coverage from that of firm size, we add the 
square of market value of equity to control for the potentially nonlinear relation between firm size and 
underpricing. Note that we already take logs of market value to control for potential nonlinearity.  In 
this additional analysis (not tabulated), we find a significantly negative coefficient on market value and 
a significantly positive coefficient on squared market value, consistent with SEO underpricing 
decreasing with firm size at a decreasing rate.  More important, the effect of analyst coverage on 
underpricing is robust; the coefficient on analyst coverage is almost the same as reported in Table 5.  
We also consider two alternative proxies for firm size (sales and total assets) and, again, the results (not 
tabulated) on analyst coverage are similar to those reported.   
                                                          
22 Untabulated results indicate that there are no significant differences in market capitalization between different 
residual analyst coverage groups for the full sample or within any size-based sub-sample.  This observation 
suggests that this approach successfully controls for the impact of firm size. 




In sum, the above tests suggest that the documented relation between analyst coverage and SEO 
underpricing is unlikely to be driven by firm size.  
Controlling for the potential impact of information asymmetry on analyst coverage  
One potential concern with our inferences is that low information asymmetry among investors 
may attract analyst coverage, leading to the observed negative correlation between analyst coverage and 
SEO underpricing.  As discussed earlier, in this paper’s context, low information asymmetry refers to 
either low divergence in investors’ knowledge or broad investor interest.  Because these two dimensions 
have different implications for analyst coverage, we address them separately. 
First, from a theoretical point of view, analysts tend to follow firms with high divergence in 
investors’ valuations, because private information acquisition activities for these firms are more 
profitable (Bhushan 1989).  That is, high divergence in investors’ valuations increases (rather than 
decreases) analyst coverage.  Extant research finds results consistent with this argument: analyst 
coverage is higher for firms with higher return volatility or more intangible assets (Bhushan 1989; 
Brennan and Hughes 1991; Barth et al. 2001).  Thus, our evidence on the negative association between 
analyst coverage and SEO underpricing is unlikely to be driven by the influence of this dimension of 
information asymmetry on analyst coverage.23  
Second, broad investor interest might attract analyst coverage, as there is high demand for 
analysts’ research (O’Brien and Bhushan 1990).  To address this possibility, we explicitly control for 
investor interest.  In the analyses reported above, we already include some proxies for investor interest, 
such as firm size.  Another potentially important proxy is institutional ownership.  We explicitly test 
whether the results on analyst coverage hold after controlling for institutional ownership.  We collect 
                                                          
23 When a firm has a more forthcoming disclosure policy, presumably leading to lower information asymmetry 
among investors, the cost of following the firm is lower, and hence analyst coverage increases.  While this cost 
argument might explain the results on analyst coverage, it does not explain the incremental impact of lead 
underwriter coverage and high ability analyst coverage on SEO underpricing.  In a sensitivity test (not tabulated), 
we explicitly control for disclosure quality, using the number of management forecasts in the year prior to the SEO 
as a proxy.  The results on analyst coverage hold and the coefficient on the disclosure quality proxy is marginally 
significantly negative.   
 




institutional ownership data from CDA/Spectrum, and use institutional ownership at the beginning of 
the calendar quarter in which the SEO was issued in our analyses.  Institutional ownership is available 
for 4,006 SEOs and averages 37.2%.  
Results are reported in Panel C of Table 7.  The first two columns (Model 1 and Model 2) 
replicate the analyses reported in Table 5.  In this slightly smaller sample, the results on analyst 
coverage are similar to those reported in Table 5 for the full sample.  Model 3 includes both analyst 
coverage and institutional ownership.  The results on analyst coverage remain similar to those reported 
above.  Consistent with its being a proxy for investor interest, institutional ownership has a significant 
negative coefficient.  The results are robust to including control variables (Model 4).  
An arguably better proxy for short-term investor interest is the ownership of institutional investors 
who actively trade.  We use the approach described in Bushee (1998) to identify active institutional 
investors (called “transient” in Bushee 1998) who trade more frequently relative to other institutional 
investors.  Similar to total institutional ownership, active institutional ownership is measured at the 
beginning of the calendar quarter in which the SEO was issued.  Active institutional ownership has a 
mean of 10.9%.  The results based on active institutional ownership are reported in the last two columns 
of Panel C of Table 7.  Like total institutional ownership, active institutional ownership is negatively 
associated with SEO underpricing after controlling for analyst coverage (Model 5) and additional 
control variables (Model 6).  The coefficient on analyst coverage remains significantly negative. 
In additional analyses (not tabulated), we control for other proxies for investor interest: the 
number of institutional investors, the number of total shareholders, trading volume over the year prior to 
SEO, stock returns in the year prior to SEO, and whether the firm belongs to S&P 500.  Not 
surprisingly, these proxies are highly correlated with firm size and institutional ownership.  After 
controlling for these proxies, the negative coefficient on analyst coverage remains significant.   
In sum, the negative relation between analyst coverage and SEO underpricing is robust to 
including proxies for investor interest.  Note that our approach here is conservative in the sense that the 
impact of analyst coverage on SEO underpricing through its influence on investor interest is not 




captured by the coefficient on analyst coverage.  The coefficient only captures the impact of analyst 
coverage through reducing differences in investors’ knowledge.  Overall, although we cannot 
completely rule out the alternative explanation that low information asymmetry among investors attracts 
analyst coverage, the above discussions suggest that our results are more consistent with analyst 
coverage reducing information asymmetry among investors than with this alternative explanation.  
Other sensitivity tests 
We also conduct additional analyses to ensure that our results are robust to alternative measure of 
analyst coverage, to other factors potentially affecting SEO underpricing, and to different sample 
periods.  
Alternative measures of analyst coverage 
One potential limitation of our measure of analyst coverage is that it does not distinguish between 
analysts with sporadic forecasts from those with frequent forecasts.  For example, an analyst who issues 
a single forecast early in the year might have little impact on the information environment of the firm 
before SEO issuance.  To address this concern, we use two alternative approaches to measure analyst 
coverage.  First, we use a shorter horizon to measure analyst coverage – the number of unique analysts 
who issue forecasts in the six months or three months, rather than one year, before the SEO issuance.  A 
shorter horizon should better capture the impact of analyst research activity on information environment 
before SEO issuance.  Second, we use the number of earnings forecasts issued in the year prior to SEO 
issuance to capture analysts’ research effort.  The results (not tabulated) based on these alternative 
measures are similar to those reported. 
Lead underwriter reputation 
Prior research (e.g., Beatty and Ritter 1986) suggests that lead underwriter reputation might affect 
underpricing.  Underwriters with a better reputation are better at placing shares, which tends to reduce 
underpricing.  Including a lead underwriter reputation score (collected from Jay Ritter’s homepage) in 




the regressions does not affect the results related to analyst coverage, and the reputation score has a 
negative association with underpricing, consistent with prior research. 
The impact of potential mispricing 
If a stock is overvalued, managers are more likely to issue new shares (Myers and Majlof 1984, 
among others) and, at the same time, analysts may be more likely to cover such stock (Jegadeesh et al. 
2004).  To ensure the robustness of our inferences, we control for potential mispricing by including 
proxies for return momentum and glamour stock characteristics.  Specifically, we include stock returns 
in the year before SEO and P/B (P/E) measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year before the SEO.  
The results on analyst coverage (not tabulated) remain qualitatively similar and none of the mispricing 
proxies are significant. 
Results for sub-periods 
To investigate whether the results hold for different sample periods, we redo all regression 
analyses for two sub-periods: 1984-1990 and 1991-2000.  We find similar results regarding analyst 
coverage for each sub-period.  We also run yearly regressions over the sample period and base our 
results on the average of yearly coefficients and the associated t-statistics with the Newey-West 
correction (Fama and MacBeth 1973; Newey and West 1987).  The results (not tabulated) for analyst 
coverage are similar to those reported. 
 
7. Conclusion  
In this paper, we investigate whether the amount and nature of analyst coverage reduces the cost 
of raising equity capital by reducing information asymmetry among investors (including divergence in 
valuations and lack of investor interest).  Examining the association between analyst coverage and the 
cost of raising capital is important given financial analysts’ role as major information intermediaries in 
the capital markets.  It is also timely given the recent criticism of financial analysts from regulators and 
investors, who are concerned with analysts’ alleged conflicts of interest.  We choose a setting, seasoned 
equity offering (SEO) underpricing, where we can directly measure the cost of raising equity capital.  




This setting also provides a powerful research design because, compared with alternative settings, SEO 
underpricing is less subject to measurement errors, endogeneity problems, and confounding concurrent 
events. 
Based on 4,766 SEOs in the period 1984-2000, we find that analyst coverage is negatively 
correlated with SEO underpricing.  The difference in SEO underpricing is both economically and 
statistically significant.  Compared with firms without analyst coverage, firms followed by three (eight) 
analysts have a 1.19% (1.89%) lower SEO underpricing, a relative decrease of 38% (60%).  The impact 
of analyst coverage on SEO underpricing is larger for small firms and for firms with relatively low 
analyst coverage.  Further evidence indicates that coverage by analysts with superior access to 
information (analysts affiliated with the lead underwriter of a SEO), by analysts with superior ability 
(Institutional Investor All-American team analysts and experienced analysts), or by analysts with less 
divergent forecasts is associated with a further decrease in SEO underpricing.  These findings are 
consistent with the cost of raising equity capital decreasing with both the quantity and the quality of 
analyst coverage.  
In interpreting our results, an important caveat to remember is that some omitted inherent firm 
characteristic(s) may lead to both higher analyst coverage and lower divergence of opinions among 
investors, which in turn leads to lower SEO underpricing.  While we address this issue in several ways, 
we cannot completely rule out the possibility that omitted firm characteristics drive our results. 
Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence consistent with analyst 
coverage lowering the cost of raising equity capital.  Such evidence should be of interest to researchers 
using analyst coverage to proxy for the degree of information asymmetry among investors, to 
researchers assuming that a higher level of analyst coverage is a benefit of improved financial reporting 
or voluntary disclosure, and to firms interested in reducing the cost of raising equity capital.  The 
evidence is also potentially useful to policy makers contemplating regulations that attempt to address 
analysts’ alleged conflicts of interest and encourage independent analyst research.  The results in this 




paper suggest that new regulations could have a negative (positive) economic consequence if they 
reduce (increase) analyst coverage, resulting in a higher (lower) cost of raising equity capital. 
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SEO Underpricing Negative one times the close-to-offer return, which is calculated from the 
previous day’s closing price to the offer price. 
  
Analyst characteristics  
Analyst Coverage The number of unique analysts issuing earnings forecasts as covered in I/B/E/S 
in the year prior to the offer.  We use log transformation, ln(1+analyst 




One if at least one of the analysts following the firm in the year prior to the 
offer is employed by the lead underwriter, zero otherwise.  
 
High Ability Analyst 
Coverage 
One if at least two of the analysts following the firm in the year prior to the 
offer are Institutional Investor All-American team analysts or experienced 
analysts.  Experienced analysts are those with general experience in the top 
quartile of all financial analysts covered in I/B/E/S in that year.  Individual 
analysts’ general experience is measured as the number of quarters between the 
first earnings forecast issued by the analyst (for any firm) and the offer date of 
the SEO. 
 
Forecast Dispersion The standard deviation of one-year-ahead earnings forecasts in the month before 




Market Value Closing price on the day prior to the offer times the total outstanding shares 
prior to the offer. We use log transformation, ln(market value), in regressions. 
 
Volatility   The standard deviation of daily returns in the year prior to the offer. 
 
Relative Offer Size Offered shares divided by total outstanding shares prior to the offer. 
 
CAR The cumulative market adjusted return over the five days prior to the offer, 
where market return is defined as the return on the CRSP value-weighted index. 
CAR_positive (CAR_negative) is CAR if CAR is positive (negative), and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Price The closing price on the day prior to the offer. We use log transformation, 
ln(price), in regressions. 
 
Tick<1/4 A dummy variable that equals one if the decimal portion of the closing price on 
the day prior to the offer is not an increment of $0.25. 
 
Rule10b-21 A dummy variable that equals one if the issues are offered after Rule 10b-21 
became effective on August 25, 1988. 
 
IPO Underpricing The average underpricing across all IPOs in the same month as the SEO, where 
monthly underpricing estimates for IPOs are obtained from Jay Ritter’s web 
page at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipoall.html. 
 
NYSE Dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the firm was listed on the NYSE at the 
time of the offer and zero if the firm was listed on NASDAQ. 






SEO underpricing by year 
 
This figure plots the mean seasoned equity offering (SEO) underpricing by year.  Underpricing is defined as 
negative one times the return from the closing price on the day prior to the offer to the offer price.  The sample 
includes 4,766 SEOs on the NYSE and NASDAQ from 1984 through 2000 that meet the sample restrictions 































































Figure 2  
Analyst coverage and SEO underpricing 
 
This figure plots mean seasoned equity offering (SEO) underpricing by the level of analyst coverage.  
Underpricing is defined as negative one times the return from the closing price on the day prior to the offer to the 
offer price. Analyst coverage is measured as the number of unique analysts issuing earnings forecasts in the year 
prior to the offer, based on the I/B/E/S Detailed Earnings Forecasts file.  The sample includes 4,766 SEOs on the 
NYSE and NASDAQ from 1984 through 2000 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text.  The last 


























Figure 3  
Change in analyst coverage and change in SEO underpricing 
 
This figure plots the mean change in seasoned equity offering (SEO) underpricing versus the change in analyst 
coverage for firms with multiple SEOs.  Of our sample firms, 635 firms have two SEOs, 170 have three SEOs, and 
164 have four or more SEOs.  We measure the change in analyst coverage and the change in underpricing for 
consecutive SEOs (that is, 1st SEO vs. 2nd SEO, 2nd SEO vs. 3rd SEO, 3rd SEO vs. 4th SEO) and then estimate the 
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics on SEOs and analyst coverage 
 
The sample includes 4,766 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) on the NYSE and NASDAQ from 1984 through 
2000 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text.  Underpricing is defined as negative one times the 
return from the closing price on the day prior to the offer to the offer price.  Analyst coverage is measured as the 
number of unique analysts issuing earnings forecasts in the year prior to the offer, based on the I/B/E/S Detailed 
Earnings Forecasts file.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on SEO characteristics 
 
Characteristic a N Mean  Std. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
Offer Price ($) 4,766 25.42 18.88 14 21.5 31 
Offer Proceeds ($million) 4,766 85.27 144.32 22.50 45.90 90.80 
Gross Spread (%) 4,521 5.12 1.37 4.47 5.22 5.93 
Underpricing (%) 4,766 2.38 4.46 0.00 1.00 3.23 
 
a Offer proceeds (offer price times shares offered in the market) are the gross amount of proceeds from the SEO.  
Gross spread represents the difference between offer proceeds and the amount the issuer receives, and is used to 
compensate the underwriters participating in the issue.  Gross spread reported in the table is deflated by offer 
proceeds. 
 
Panel B: Yearly number of SEOs and the associated mean underpricing 
 
Year N Mean underpricing 
1984 106 0.82% 
1985 225 0.66% 
1986 284 1.00% 
1987 174 0.73% 
1988 71 0.75% 
1989 131 1.14% 
1990 106 1.44% 
1991 320 2.45% 
1992 287 2.71% 
1993 432 3.20% 
1994 272 3.38% 
1995 416 3.19% 
1996 499 3.27% 
1997 488 2.39% 
1998 368 1.54% 
1999 288 2.93% 
2000 299 3.11% 
 
Total 4,766 2.38% 
 
 




Table 1 (continued) 
Descriptive statistics on SEOs and analyst coverage 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics on analyst coverage 
 
Analyst coverage group b Analyst coverage N Subtotal 
 
Group 1 0 1,186 1,186 
    
1 312 
2 429 Group 2 






































































b Groups are defined by the number of analysts covering the firm and are of approximately equal size.   
c There are less than 10 observations with a particular analyst coverage level which is higher than 30.  For 
convenience, we report all observations with analyst coverage of 31 and above in one line. 
 







Regression of abnormal trading volume on analyst coverage  
 
The dependent variable is abnormal trading volume on the SEO announcement day, measured as share turnover 
(trading volume scaled by total outstanding shares) on the announcement day, standardized by average turnover in 
the control period (the two-month period before the announcement day).  The sample includes 4,510 SEOs on the 
NYSE and NASDAQ from 1984 through 2000.  Stock return is measured on the announcement day. Market 
trading volume is the average abnormal trading volume of all stocks covered by CRSP on the SEO announcement 
day. Sales growth is the percentage increase in sales in the fiscal year before SEO announcement. Past stock 
returns are the market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns in the year before SEO announcement. Please see the 







Analyst Coverage -0.039 
 (-3.85) 
Firm Size -0.018 
 (-1.83) 
NYSE Dummy 0.322 
 (15.97) 
|Stock Return| 3.525 
 (7.97) 
Relative Offer Size -0.044 
 (-0.69) 
Market Trading Volume 0.394 
 (3.59) 
Sales Growth -0.054 
 (-6.91) 
Past Stock Returns -0.111 
 (-14.52) 
 
Year Dummies Yes 
Adj. R2 0.127 






Univariate analysis of the relation between analyst coverage and SEO underpricing 
 
The sample includes 4,766 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) on the NYSE and NASDAQ from 1984 through 
2000 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text.  Underpricing is defined as negative one times the 
return from the closing price on the day prior to the offer to the offer price.  Analyst coverage is measured as the 
number of unique analysts issuing earnings forecasts in the year prior to the offer, based on the I/B/E/S Detailed 
Earnings Forecasts file. 
 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
     
Analyst Coverage 0 1-3 4-7 8 and above 
Number of SEOs 1,186 1,193 1,146 1,241 
     
Mean underpricing (%) 3.16 3.31 2.05 1.04 
t-statistics for differences in mean 
underpricing compared with: 
    
   Group 2 -0.73    
   Group 3 5.50 *** 7.79 ***   
   Group 4 10.77 *** 14.61 *** 7.43 ***  
 
*** Significant at the 0.001 level based on one-tailed tests. 





Table 4   
Descriptive statistics on the independent variables  
 
The sample includes 4,766 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) on the NYSE and NASDAQ from 1984 through 
2000 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text.  Please see the Appendix for variable measurement. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on variables used in multiple regressions 
 
 Mean  Std. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
 
Analyst Coverage 5.785 7.115 0 3 8 
Market Value ($million) 994 3,847 110 271 738 
Volatility 0.033 0.018 0.019 0.030 0.041 
Relative Offer Size 0.221 0.212 0.104 0.179 0.281 
CAR_Positive 0.018 0.045 0 0 0.018 
CAR_Negative -0.039 0.053 -0.058 -0.017 0 
Rule10b-21 0.824 0.381 1 1 1 
Price ($) 26 19 14 22 32 
Tick<1/4 0.398 0.490 0 0 1 
IPO Underpricing 0.214 0.209 0.112 0.155 0.210 
NYSE Dummy 0.416 0.493 0 0 1 
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Table 4  (continued) 
Descriptive statistics on the independent variables  
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
The lower (upper) triangle reports Pearson (Spearman) correlations.  To be consistent with later regression analyses, we use log transformation of analyst 























Underpricing  -0.18 -0.24 0.43 0.29 0.09 -0.03 -0.21 0.01 a 0.24 0.10 -0.34 
 
Analyst Coverage -0.20  0.51 0.00 a -0.38 0.03 0.04 0.39 0.00 a -0.05 0.07 0.11 
 
Market Value -0.21 0.52  -0.22 -0.67 0.06 0.10 0.74 0.11 0.19 0.24 0.39 
 
Volatility 0.25 -0.01 a -0.10  0.29 0.05 -0.20 -0.18 -0.03 0.20 0.21 -0.64 
 
Relative Offer Size 0.23 -0.29 -0.49 0.15  -0.02 a -0.10 -0.46 -0.07 0.04 -0.05 -0.30 
 
CAR_Positive 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.22 0.00 a  0.82 0.11 -0.02 a 0.00 a 0.09 -0.02 a 
 
CAR_Negative -0.07 0.05 0.10 -0.33 -0.08 0.30  0.14 -0.01 a -0.05 0.03 a 0.15 
 
Price -0.21 0.38 0.74 -0.07 -0.36 0.17 0.13  0.00 a 0.09 0.23 0.20 
 
Tick<1/4 0.01 a -0.01 a 0.11 a 0.00 a -0.02 a 0.01 a -0.01 a -0.01 a  0.09 -0.01 a -0.01 a 
 
Rule 10b-21 0.16 -0.06 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.06 -0.08 0.09 0.09  0.54 -0.13 
 
IPO Underpricing 0.04 0.10 0.29 0.40 -0.07 0.24 -0.11 0.31 0.02 0.81  -0.09 
 
NYSE Dummy -0.17 0.11 0.38 -0.55 -0.16 -0.11 0.23 0.18 -0.01 a -0.13 -0.13  
 
a indicates that the correlation is insignificant at the 0.05 level based on two-tailed tests.  All other correlation coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level or 
lower. 
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Table 5  
Multiple regressions of SEO underpricing on analyst coverage and control variables – tests of H1 
 
The dependent variable is SEO underpricing.  The sample includes 4,766 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) on 
the NYSE and NASDAQ from 1984 through 2000 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text.  Please 




signs Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept  0.0218 0.0289 
  (13.22) (6.59) 
Analyst Coverage – H1 - -0.0086 -0.0040 
  (-14.11) (-5.53) 
Market Value -  -0.0010 
   (-1.24) 
Volatility +  0.4540 
   (9.43) 
Relative Offer Size +  0.0224 
   (6.74) 
CAR_Positive ?  0.0337 
   (2.23) 
CAR_Negative ?  0.0272 
   (2.04) 
Rule10b-21 -  0.0018 
   (0.49) 
Price -  -0.0083 
   (-5.60) 
Tick<1/4 +  0.0004 
   (0.29) 
IPO Underpricing +  -0.0100 
   (-1.17) 
NYSE Dummy -  0.0001 
   (0.06) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2  0.080 0.153 
The effect of coverage by three analysts (%)a -1.19 -0.55 
The effect of coverage by eight analysts (%)a -1.89 -0.88 
 
a These numbers represent the difference in underpricing between SEOs covered by three (median analyst 
coverage) or eight analysts (the third quartile) and SEOs with zero analyst coverage, and are calculated as the 
coefficient on analyst coverage multiplied by ln(1+3), or ln(1+8). 




Attributes of analyst coverage and SEO underpricing 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on analyst coverage attributes  
 
The sample includes all seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) on the NYSE and NASDAQ from 1984 through 2000 
that meet the sample restrictions described in the text.  Lead underwriter coverage and high ability analyst 
coverage are defined only for firms with positive analyst coverage, and forecast dispersion is estimated only for 
firms with at least three analysts following.  Please see the Appendix for variable measurement. 
 
 N Mean  Std. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
Lead Underwriter Coverage 3,580 0.673 0.469 0 1 1 
High Ability Analyst Coverage 3,580 0.576 0.494 0 1 1 
Forecast Dispersion 2,627 0.0052 0.0082 0.0009 0.0023 0.0057 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Attributes of analyst coverage and SEO underpricing 
 
Panel B: Does SEO underpricing vary with the quality of analyst coverage? – tests of H2 and H3 
 
The dependent variable is SEO underpricing.  The sample includes 3,580 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) on 
the NYSE and NASDAQ from 1984 through 2000 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text and 
have positive analyst coverage.  Control variables include Market Value, Volatility, Relative Offer Size, 
CAR_Positive, CAR_Negative, Price, Tick<1/4, Rule10b-21, IPO Underpricing, and NYSE Dummy.  Please see 




signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept  0.0408 0.0378 0.0421 0.0416 
  (14.30) (12.57) (12.85) (8.12) 
Analyst Coverage – H1 a - -0.0158 -0.0161 -0.0163 -0.0091 
  (-10.81) (-8.02) (-7.57) (-4.30) 
Lead Underwriter Coverage – H2 b - -0.0200  -0.0165 -0.0153 
  (-5.98)  (-4.61) (-4.46) 
High Ability Analyst Coverage – H3 b -  -0.0202 -0.0132 -0.0152 
   (-4.91) (-3.01) (-3.53) 
Analyst Coverage × Lead Underwriter c + 0.0073  0.0056 0.0052 
  (4.13)  (3.00) (2.91) 
Analyst Coverage × High Ability c +  0.0089 0.0051 0.0077 
   (3.75) (2.02) (3.10) 
Control Variables  No No No Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2  0.118 0.113 0.121 0.198 
 
a This coefficient reflects the impact of analyst coverage on underpricing for SEOs without lead underwriter or 
high ability analyst coverage. 
b (c) This coefficient reflects the impact of lead underwriter or high ability analyst coverage on overall SEO 
underpricing – intercept effect (on the impact of analyst coverage, i.e., the number of analysts following, on SEO 
underpricing – slope effect).  
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Table 6 (continued) 
Attributes of analyst coverage and SEO underpricing 
 
Panel C: Does SEO underpricing vary with forecast dispersion? – tests of H4 
 
The dependent variable is SEO underpricing.  The sample includes 2,627 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) on 
the NYSE and NASDAQ from 1984 through 2000 that have at least three analysts following and meet the 
sample restrictions described in the text.  Control variables include Market Value, Volatility, Relative Offer Size, 
CAR_Positive, CAR_Negative, Price, Tick<1/4, Rule10b-21, IPO Underpricing, and NYSE Dummy.  Please see 




signs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept  0.0231 0.0167 0.0195 0.0134 
  (8.57) (3.28) (7.19) (2.60) 
Analyst Coverage – H1 - -0.0080 -0.0018 -0.0084 -0.0024 
   (-8.24) (-1.35) (-8.73) (-1.72) 
Forecast Dispersion – H4 +   0.5221 0.3058 
    (7.00) (3.82) 
Control Variables  No Yes No Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2  0.073 0.124 0.089 0.128 
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Table 7 
Additional analyses on the relation between analyst coverage and SEO underpricing 
 
Panel A: Does the effect of analyst coverage on SEO underpricing vary with firm size?  
 
The dependent variable is SEO underpricing.  The sample includes 4,766 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) on 
the NYSE and NASDAQ from 1984 through 2000 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text.  
Control variables include Volatility, Relative Offer Size, CAR_Positive, CAR_Negative, Price, Tick<1/4, 
Rule10b-21, IPO Underpricing, and NYSE dummy.  Please see the Appendix for variable measurement.  T-




signs Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept  0.0461 0.0424 
  (10.66) (8.14) 
Analyst Coverage – H1 - -0.0177 -0.0135 
   (-7.58) (-5.72) 
Market Value - -0.0083 -0.0039 
  (-10.51) (-3.64) 
Analyst Coverage × Market Value  + 0.0022 0.0016 
  (6.10) (4.21) 
Control Variables  No Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2  0.144 0.157 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Additional analyses on the relation between analyst coverage and SEO underpricing 
 
Panel B: Residual analyst coverage and SEO underpricing  
 
The sample includes 4,766 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) on the NYSE and NASDAQ from 1984 through 
2000 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text.  Residual analyst coverage is the residual of a 
regression of analyst coverage on market value.  Four equal-sized analyst coverage groups are formed based on 
quartiles of residual analyst coverage in the sample.  Independently, the sample is split into three equal-sized 
sub-samples based on market value.  The table reports the mean underpricing for each residual coverage group or 





Sub-samples based on firm size 
Residual analyst  
coverage group 
Full sample 
 Small Medium Large 
 
1 (Low coverage) 3.01% 4.40% 2.66% 1.89% 
[N] [1,191] [411] [385] [395] 
 
2  2.92% 3.70% 2.67% 2.12% 
[N] [1,192] [464] [395] [333] 
 
3 2.10% 3.36% 1.70% 1.13% 
[N] [1,192] [405] [431] [356] 
 
4 (High coverage) 1.49% 2.57% 1.58% 0.76% 
[N] [1,191] [308] [378] [505] 
 
1 – 4 1.52% *** 1.83% *** 1.08% *** 1.12% *** 
(t-statistics) (7.96) (4.66) (3.23) (4.44) 
 
*** Significant at the 0.001 level based on one-tailed tests. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Additional analyses on the relation between analyst coverage and SEO underpricing 
 
Panel C: Results after controlling for institutional ownership 
 
The dependent variable is SEO underpricing.  The sample includes 4,006 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) from 
1984 through 2000 that have institutional ownership data from CDA/Spectrum and meet the sample restrictions 
described in the text.  Total and active institutional ownership are measured at the beginning of the calendar 
quarter in which the SEO was issued.  We follow Bushee (1998) to identify active institutional investors.  
Control variables include Market Value, Volatility, Relative Offer Size, CAR_Positive, CAR_Negative, Price, 
Tick<1/4, Rule10b-21, IPO Underpricing, and NYSE Dummy.  Please see the Appendix for variable 
measurement.  T-statistics are shown below the coefficients (in parentheses). 
 
 Predicted Basic models  
Total  
institutional ownership  
Active  
institutional ownership 
 signs Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept  0.0262 0.0230  0.0319 0.0172  0.0278 0.0179 
  (15.09) (4.34)  (18.09) (3.23)  (15.97) (3.34) 
Analyst Coverage – H1 - -0.0082 -0.0050  -0.0050 -0.0037  -0.0069 -0.0043 
  (-12.45) (-6.52)  (-7.11) (-4.77)  (-10.03) (-5.48) 
Institutional Ownership -    -0.0390 -0.0254  -0.0477 -0.0403 
     (-12.46) (-7.63)  (-6.75) (-5.69) 
Control Variables  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2  0.071 0.157  0.105 0.169  0.081 0.164 
 
